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Abstract 
 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: The post-Apartheid South African (SA) corporate governance (CG) 
model is a unique hybridisation of the traditional Anglo-American and Continental European-
Asian CG models, distinctively requiring firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative 
action and stakeholder CG provisions, such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids. This paper 
examines the association between a broad CG index and firm value in this distinct corporate 
setting. 
Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of 169 post-Apartheid SA firms from 2002 to 
2007, we find a significant positive association between a broad CG index and firm value, as 
proxied by Tobin’s Q. Distinct from prior studies, but consistent with political cost, legitimacy 
and resource dependence theories, we find that compliance with affirmative action CG 
provisions impacts positively on firm value. The results are robust across a number of 
econometric models that control for different types of endogeneity, accounting and market-based 
firm valuation measures. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper contributes to the literature on the association 
between compliance with codes of good governance and firm value by specifically modelling the 
relationship within a unique institutional, legal and CG environment. Distinctively, we contribute 
to the literature by showing how affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions impact on 
firm value. 
Practical/Policy Implications: The results have important policy implications for companies 
and regulators. They suggest that investors reward firms with better CG practices with higher 
market valuation, providing support to the efforts by various stakeholders at improving CG 
standards in SA companies. The results also suggest that SA companies who pay serious 
attention to complying with affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions may reap benefits 
in the form of higher firm value. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Affirmative Action, Firm Value, South Africa, 
Endogeneity  
 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory suggests a positive association between corporate governance (CG) and firm 
value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), as good governance improves managerial monitoring and 
decision-making, as well as reduces managerial expropriation and wastage, and thereby enhances 
operating performance and market valuation (Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu 2010). However, 
while a number of prior studies (reviewed below) suggest a positive link between CG and firm 
value, most have been unable to conclusively indicate that good governance actually impacts 
positively on firm value. A number of reasons may explain the empirically weak association 
between CG and firm value. First, prior studies have been criticised for methodological 
weaknesses, with particular regard to inadequately addressing endogeneity problems (Guest, 
2009; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010), as well as insufficient control for any potential interrelations 
between CG and other possible alternative CG mechanisms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Beiner, 
Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006).  
Second, due to the highly labour-intensive nature of collecting firm-level CG data 
directly from company annual reports (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004), prior studies have 
mostly used subjective analysts’ CG ratings, often supplied by rating agencies, such as Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) (Klapper & Love, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005). Renders et al. 
(2010) show that the use of such subjective analysts’ CG ratings leads to significant sample 
selection bias as they tend to be severely biased towards a few large firms. The associated 
econometric problems weaken statistical power and obscure the association between CG and 
firm value (Core, Guay, & Rusticus, 2006; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). Thirdly, and crucially, the 
prior literature notes that CG structures and systems vary across different countries (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazzura, 2009). However, past cross-country studies have not generally employed 
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subjective analysts’ CG ratings, which are standardised such that they fail to reflect unique 
institutional, cultural and contextual differences in CG mechanisms across different countries 
(Morey, Gottesman, Baker, & Godridge, 2009; Renders et al., 2010), but also such studies 
remain disproportionately concentrated in the developed countries of Europe and US with 
comparatively similar institutional settings (Gomper, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Baur, Gunster, & 
Otten, 2004; Cremers & Nair, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Chen, 
Chung, Hsu, & Wu, 2010). However, the role and effectiveness of CG may arguably be different 
in developing countries, such as South Africa (SA), due to the different institutional, cultural, 
legal and CG environment (as discussed further below). As such the link between CG and firm 
value can be expected to be different from what has been reported in developed countries. 
 The current study attempts to address the above limitations by investigating the 
association between CG and firm value in a distinct post-Apartheid SA corporate context. 
Historically, South Africa’s CG model has predominantly been Anglo-American (shareholding) 
in orientation, with firms primarily expected to serve the interests of shareholders. However, 
post-Apartheid CG reforms, especially the 2002 King Report (King II), distinctively require SA 
firms to explicitly comply with a number of affirmative action and stakeholder issues meant to 
address historical socio-economic inequalities between white and non-white South Africans. 
These include compliance with black economic empowerment, employment equity and 
HIV/Aids CG provisions. This compels SA firms to depict some of the key features of both the 
shareholding and stakeholding (Continental Europe-Asia) models of CG in their annual reports, 
and thus explicitly makes the South African CG model a hybrid and unique within the Anglo-
American world (Andreasson, 2010).  
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Given this context, the crucial policy question, is whether the current hybrid South 
African CG framework is sufficiently robust to effectively achieve the contrasting objectives of 
maximising shareholder value and providing a meaningful protection of the interests of a larger 
stakeholder group (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). On the one hand, in order to 
effectively address affirmative action and stakeholder needs, post-Apartheid SA firms will 
invariably have to incur extra costs with a potential negative effect on shareholder value (LSE, 
2007; Ntim, 2009). On the other hand, political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence 
theories (Malherbe & Segal, 2003; Andreasson, 2010) suggest that compliance with stakeholder 
CG provisions does not only help in reducing political costs, but also offers greater access to 
resources that can be translated into improved operating performance and market valuation. 
Resource dependence may be particularly important in SA, given that securing and renewing 
profitable government and mining contracts are usually linked to meeting affirmative action, 
such as black empowerment (Malherbe & Segal, 2003). Hence, we examine the link between CG 
and firm value within this arguably unique institutional setting, where there is also a conspicuous 
dearth of empirical evidence (Khanchel El Mehdi, 2007; Mangena & Chamisa, 2008). 
Importantly, and distinct from prior studies, we construct a broad CG index specifically for the 
South African setting that permits us to uniquely investigate how specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder issues, such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids, affect firm value.  
In addition, we explicitly address methodological and econometric problems that have 
characterised most previous studies. To avoid sample selection bias, our sample is based on all 
the firms that are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Ltd, with the CG data 
collected directly from company annual reports. We also address different types of endogeneity 
problems, including simultaneity and firm-level fixed effects, as well as control for potential 
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interrelations between our broad CG index and four alternative CG mechanisms that we data on, 
including board size, leverage, block and institutional ownerships. In doing so, we make major 
contributions to the extant literature. First, using CG data collected from annual reports, we 
construct for the first time a broad CG index for a sample of 169 SA listed firms from 2002 to 
2007, consisting of 50 CG provisions based on the 2002 King Report (King II) for SA firms. 
Second, we provide evidence for the first time on the association between CG and firm value for 
SA listed firms, extending the international evidence to the SA corporate context. Third, and 
distinct from prior studies, we provide evidence on how compliance with the SA context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions affects the market value of SA listed firms. 
Finally, and different from most previous studies, we explicitly address the problem of 
endogeneity, as well as control for possible complementary or substitution effects between 
different CG mechanisms using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. 
Our results show a statistically significant and positive association between our broad CG 
index and firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, implying that SA listed firms with better CG 
standards tend to be associated with higher market valuation. Our 2SLS results show that there is 
also a reverse association between our broad CG index and Tobin’s Q, emphasising the need for 
future research to adequately control for potential interrelations between possible alternative CG 
mechanisms and firm value for robust results. Distinct from prior studies, but consistent with 
political cost, legitimacy and resource dependence theories, we find a statistically significant and 
positive association between compliance with the SA context-specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder CG provisions and Tobin’s Q. Our results are robust across a number of econometric 
models that control for different types of endogeneity, alternative CG weighting schemes, as well 
as different types of accounting and market-based firm valuations proxies. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section examines the South 
African CG context, affirmative action and the prior literature. The following sections describe 
the data and research methodology, report the empirical results, and present a robustness analysis, 
with the concluding remarks containing a summary and a brief discussion of policy implications. 
 
THE SA CG CONTEXT, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE PRIOR LITERATURE 
SA is a particularly interesting African country to conduct a CG study. First, and unlike most 
African countries, SA possesses a relatively sound financial and regulatory structure, deep equity 
culture, and is the base for some of the world’s largest multinationals, which attract substantial 
foreign direct investments (Maherbe & Segal, 2003). This means that unlike most African 
countries, any CG failures may have serious implications far beyond SA and Africa. Second, 
ownership of firms is relatively concentrated (Barr, Gerson, & Kanto, 1995), implying stronger 
managerial monitoring, but can lead to expropriation of minority wealth (Henry, 2008). 
Concentrated ownership also means that the market for managerial and corporate control may be 
less active (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). While SA firms tend to have high levels of institutional 
ownership, shareholder activism is weak (Maherbe & Segal, 2003), and although rigorous laws 
on insider trading and listing rules have been introduced (Insider Trading Act, 1998; JSE Listing 
Rules, 2007), their implementation and enforcement is weak (King Report, 2002; Ntim, 2009). In 
sum, these SA context-specific issues can result in managerial entrenchment, as well as 
expropriation of shareholder wealth, that can impact negatively on firm value. 
Of greater relevance, however, is that CG seems to be fluidly developing in SA. A formal 
code of CG was first introduced in 1994 (King I) and revised in 2002 (King II) (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009), coinciding with the collapse of Apartheid, the historic release of Nelson 
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Mandela from prison and the subsequent assumption to power by the African National Congress 
(ANC). While CG reforms pursued so far in SA are generally similar to those of other Anglo-
American countries (see Sections 1 to 3 of the Appendix), the current South African CG model is 
distinct by its promotion of the ‘inclusive’ approach (Andreasson, 2010).  
The SA ‘inclusive’ CG approach seeks to maintain and strengthen all the Anglo-
American (shareholding) features, such as unitary boards, voluntary compliance, and majority 
outside directors, but it distinctively requires firms to explicitly comply with a number of 
affirmative action and stakeholder (stakeholding) laws passed by the ruling ANC on black 
economic empowerment, employment equity, environment and HIV/Aids (see Section 4 of the 
Appendix). As previously explained, these are aimed at addressing residual negative socio-
economic legacies of Apartheid. For example, preferential procurement provisions of the 2003 
Black Empowerment Act require SA corporations to as much as possible acquire their raw 
materials from a non-white supplier irrespective of costs. Additionally, SA companies are 
required to comply with positive discriminatory practices regarding board appointments, 
enterprise development, and equity ownership, amongst others. In sum, these affirmative action 
provisions may arguably impact differently on firm value, and as such the association between 
CG and firm value can be expected to be different from what has been reported in other Anglo-
American countries. 
The empirical literature on the association between CG and firm value is not only mixed, 
but also concentrated in Europe and the US. For example, Gompers et al. (2003), Cremers and 
Nair (2005) and Bebchuk et al. (2009) have examined the relationship between a broad CG index 
and firm value for sampleS of US firms, with the findings showing that CG impacts positively on 
firm value. In contrast, and after controlling for endogeneity, Core et al. (2006) and Bhagat and 
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Bolton (2008) find no evidence of an association between CG and firm value in samples of US 
firms, casting doubt on prior studies, as well as highlighting the relevance of adequately 
controlling for endogeneity. Previous European studies have also reported similar conflicting 
results. While Baur et al. (2004) report no evidence of a relationship between CG and firm value 
in a sample of European firms, Drobetz et al. (2004) and Beiner et al. (2006) find that CG is 
positively related to firm value in samples of German and Swiss firms, respectively. After 
controlling for both endogeneity and sample selection bias, Renders et al. (2010) also report 
positive association between CG and firm value in a sample of European firms, but find an 
insignificant or negative relationship if the two problems are not properly addressed, re-
enforcing the need to sufficiently control for both sample selection bias and endogeneity for 
robust results.    
Limited, but more consistent evidence has been reported for a number of emerging 
markets. Black (2001), Black et al. (2006), Black and Khanna (2007), Henry (2008), and Garay 
and González (2008) have investigated the association between a broad CG index and firm value, 
using samples of Russian, South Korean, Indian, Australian, and Venezuelan listed firms, 
respectively. Consistent with past cross-country studies in emerging markets (Klapper & Love, 
2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009), the results of these studies indicate a positive 
relationship between CG and firm value. Of special note, despite increasing evidence that sample 
selection bias and endogeneity problems can confound research findings (Chen et al., 2010; 
Renders et al., 2010), a majority of the prior cross-country studies in emerging markets do not 
explicitly address these problems, casting doubt on the reliability of the results of these studies 
(Klapper & Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009). For example, the CLSA 2000 subjective  analysts’ 
CG ratings used in previous cross-country studies by Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and 
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Kim (2005) include only nine1 of the largest SA listed firms, and arguably limiting the 
generalisation of their findings for SA listed firms.  
 As previously explained, the current study on CG in SA attempts to address these 
weaknesses of prior studies in several ways. First, we use the entire usable sample of 169 SA 
listed firms over a five year period in our analysis, and unlike past cross-country studies (Klapper 
& Love, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005), we are able to ascertain the effects of both cross-sectional 
and time series changes in CG on firm value, as well as improve the generalisation of the results. 
Second, we construct a broad South African CG index (SACGI) based on the CG provisions of 
King II, which unlike subjective analysts’ rankings (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009), 
has the advantage of ensuring that unique SA context-specific CG provisions, such as black 
empowerment and HIV/Aids are incorporated into the methodology. Third, and distinct from 
prior studies, we study how compliance with a sub-index of SA setting specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder CG provisions impact on our sampled firms’ market value. Finally, to 
improve the reliability of the results, we explicitly address problems that may be posed by the 
presence of endogeneities, as well as possible interdependencies among alternative CG 
mechanisms.    
 
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Data: Sample Selection, Sources, and Description 
Our sample is based on all 291 non-financial2 firms listed on the JSE as at 31/12/2007 and Table 
1 contains a summary of the sample selection procedure. Panels A and B of Table 1 show the 
industrial composition of all non-financial firms that were listed on the JSE, and the final 
sampled firms with full data, respectively. 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
We use CG and financial performance data to investigate the relationship between CG 
and firm value. The CG variables were extracted from the annual reports of the sampled 
companies. The annual reports were obtained from the Perfect Information Database, while the 
financial performance data were collected from DataStream. The firms in our final sample had to 
meet two criteria: the availability of a company’s full five year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 
inclusive, and the availability of a company’s corresponding financial data from 2003 to 2007 
inclusive.3 These criteria were imposed for several reasons. First, and in line with past research 
(Henry, 2008), the criteria helped in meeting the requirements for a balanced panel data analysis, 
and its associated advantages in terms of having both time series and cross-sectional 
observations, more degrees of freedom and less collinearity among variables (Gujarati, 2003).  
A potential weakness is that it may introduce survivorship bias into the sample selection 
process. However, and as Table 1 indicates, the criteria still generated a much larger sample size 
than what has been used in prior SA studies (Klapper & Love, 2004; Morey et al., 2009), and 
therefore, generalisation of the results of our study should not be impaired by our sample 
selection criteria. Second, contrary to much of the existing literature that employs one-year 
cross-sectional data (Klapper & Love, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005), analysing five-year data 
with both cross-sectional and time series properties may help in ascertaining whether the 
observed cross-sectional association between CG and firm value also holds over time. Using the 
above criteria, and as detailed in Panel B of Table 1, the full data is collected for 169 out of the 
2914 firms over five firm years, giving a total of 845 firm-year observations from eight industries 
for our regression analysis.  
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Research Methodology:  Definition of Variables and Model Specification 
Our main independent variable is the constructed South African CG index (SACGI), which 
involves an aggregation of the 50 CG provisions contained in King II, based on five broad 
sections covering: (1) boards, directors and ownership, (2) accounting and auditing, (3) risk 
management, internal audit and control, (4) integrated sustainability reporting, and (5) 
compliance and enforcement. These are detailed in the Appendix. All companies listed on the 
JSE are required to comply with the CG provisions or give reasons for non-compliance, enabling 
us to conduct our analysis. 
 Our SACGI is distinct from CG variables used in prior research. First, unlike most 
previous studies that focus on specific aspects of CG in isolation, for instance, shareholder rights 
(Gompers et al., 2003), and board size (Guest, 2009), SACGI covers all aspects of CG. Second, 
in line with prior research (Beiner et al., 2006), the index covers conventional CG issues, such as 
board and ownership, but distinct from past research (Morey et al., 2009), it also covers SA 
context-specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions. A sub-index defined as 
Social-SACGI that contains nine CG provisions of the SACGI is formed (see Section 4 of the 
Appendix), to cover specific aspects, such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids. The SACGI is 
constructed by awarding a value of ‘1’ for each of the 50 CG provisions of King II if disclosed in 
the annual report or ‘0’ otherwise. With this scheme, a company’s total score in a particular firm-
year can vary between zero (0%) to fifty (100%), with better-governed firms having higher index 
levels. Although this simple binary weighting scheme may fail to reflect the relative importance 
of different CG mechanisms (Gompers et al., 2003), we adopt it for a number of reasons.  
First, there is a general lack of a rigorously developed theoretical basis on which weights 
can be accurately assigned to the various CG provisions (Black et al., 2006), and thus, using an 
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unweighted coding scheme obviates a situation whereby the SACGI is unnecessarily dominated 
by a particular set of CG provisions. Second, an unweighted index is transparent and easy to 
replicate (Beiner et al., 2006). Third, prior studies suggest that the use of weighted and 
unweighted indices tend to give similar results (Beattie et al., 2004). Finally, an unweighted 
coding scheme is a well-established line of scoring CG information disclosed in annual reports 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Henry, 2008; Morey et al., 2009), and can also facilitate direct 
comparisons to be drawn with their results. Theoretically, better-governed firms can be expected 
to reduce agency costs and increase firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and hence, we 
hypothesise a positive relationship between our SACGI and firm value. 
The measure of market valuation employed in our regression is the widely used Tobin’s 
Q (Q)5. Following Chung & Pruitt (1994), Q denotes the market value of equity plus the book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity scaled by the book value of total assets. It 
measures the market’s valuation of the quality of a firm’s CG mechanisms. A higher Q generally 
suggests greater effectiveness of a firm’s CG structures, as well as a better perception of a 
company’s financial performance by the market (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). To minimise 
potential omitted variables bias, we introduce below a number of control (exogenous) variables.  
Table 2 provides a summary of all variables employed, including the control (exogenous) 
variables, the four alternative CG mechanisms (board size, leverage, block, and institutional 
ownerships) and two alternative firm value measures (return on assets and total share returns) 
that will be used in conducting robustness tests in section five. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
First, we predict a positive association between Q and growth opportunities (GROWTH), 
because firms with higher investment opportunities tend to grow relatively faster (Durnev & Kim, 
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2005). Second, firms with greater investment in research and development can gain competitive 
advantages (Chen et al., 2010), and so may have higher Q. By contrast, research and 
development is capital intensive (Henry, 2008), and as such may impact negatively on current Q. 
Similarly, Jensen (1986) suggests that higher levels of gearing can increase performance by 
reducing agency conflicts associated with having ‘free cash flows’ by opportunistic managers. In 
contrast, greater financial distress associated with higher levels of gearing can inhibit the ability 
to exploit growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986). Also, due to greater agency problems, larger 
firms are likely to maintain better CG regime Q (Beiner et al., 2006), and may have higher. By 
contrast, smaller firms have greater opportunities to grow (Klapper & Love, 2004), and may 
have higher Q. Given the mixed literature, we predict that gearing (GEAR), capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) and firm size (LNTA) will relate either positively or negatively to Q. Third, firms that 
crosslist to foreign stock markets tend to have better CG structures, as they are subjected to 
additional CG rules (Black et al., 2006; Renders et al., 2010), and may have higher Q. Hence, we 
hypothesise a positive link between Q and crosslisting (CROSLIST).  
Fourth, auditor independence and audit quality are positively associated with audit firm 
size (DeAngelo, 1981), implying that firms audited by large and reputable audit firms may have 
higher Q. Hence, we predict a positive association between Q and audit firm size. Fifth, to avoid 
endogeneity problems, we construct our regression model such that this year’s firm value (Qt) is 
associated with previous year’s CG mechanisms, and as such we follow past studies (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2006; Renders et al., 2010) and include a lagged Q as part of our controls. We 
hypothesise that Qt-1 will correlate positively with Qt. Finally, following prior research (Henry, 
2008; Guest, 2009), we predict that Q will differ across different industries and financial years. 
As such, we introduce year (2003 to 2007) and industry dummies for the five remaining 
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industries.6 Assuming that all relationships are linear, our main OLS regression equation to be 
estimated is specified as: 
    ∑
=
−−− +++=
n
i
ititiitt CONTROLSSACGIQ
1
11110 εββα                                         (1) 
where: 
Q                                          - Tobin’s Q, proxy for firm value. 
0α             - Constant term. 
SACGI            - South African Corporate Governance Index.  
CONTROLS           - Control variables for growth (GROWTH), capital  
expenditure (CAPEX), gearing (GEAR), firm size (LNTA),  
cross-listing (CROSLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), lagged Q  
(Qt-1), industry and year dummies. 
ε             -  Error term. 
 
  
2SLS, Alternative CG Mechanisms and Possible Interrelationships 
 Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) indicate that the existence of alternative CG mechanisms suggests 
that they may possibly need to interrelate to be effective. This implies that an OLS regression of 
Q on a single CG mechanism, as specified in (1), for instance, can lead to misleading results. We 
address this methodological criticism of past studies by introducing four alternative CG 
mechanisms that we have data on, in addition to our broad SACGI and Q, to develop a system of 
six simultaneous equations. The four alternative CG structures are board size (BSIZE), leverage 
(LEV), block (BLKOWN), and institutional (INSOWN) ownerships. We then estimate the six 
equations using 2SLS to investigate the link between the CG mechanisms and Q. The analysis 
involves two stages. In the first stage, we estimate each of equations (2) to (6) specified below, 
and save the resulting predicted values (i.e., predicted part of each CG structure). In the second 
stage, we use the predicted parts as instruments for the CG mechanisms, and equation (7) 
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specified below is estimated along with the control variables and their respective instruments 
using 2SLS technique. The rationale is that the choice of any one mechanism may simultaneously 
depend on others to be able to impact positively on Q. We describe how our system of six 
equations is developed below. 
 
The South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI). First, it is assumed 
that the SACGI is determined by the choices of the other four alternative CG mechanisms (LEV, 
BLKOWN, INSOWN, and BSIZE) and the exogenous variables, including growth (GROWTH), 
capital expenditure (CAPEX), gearing (GEAR), firm size (LNTA), audit firm size (BIG4), the 
presence of a CG committee (CGCOM), crosslisting (CROSLIST), industry (INDUST) and year 
dummies (YD). Labelling all nine exogenous variables simply as EXOGENOUS, the first 
equation in the system to be estimated is specified as: 
                   
itit
n
i
iitit
itititit
EXOGENOUSQBSIZE
INSOWNBLKOWNLEVSACGI
εβββ
βββα
++++
+++=
∑
=1
54
3210
                           (2) 
Leverage (LEV). Greater debt usage can reduce the agency costs of ‘free cash flows’ 
(Jensen, 1986). Therefore, the second dependent variable in our system is leverage (LEV).  
Bevan and Danbolt (2004) report that LEV is positively correlated with firm size, but negatively 
associated with profitability. Hence, we expect LEV to correlate positively with firm size (LNTA), 
but be negatively related to Q. Also, as debt increases credit risks and bankruptcy costs (Jensen, 
1986), which may inhibit the capacity to exploit investment and growth opportunities, we expect 
growth (GROWTH) and investment (CAPEX) potential to be negatively associated with LEV. 
LEV is also expected to differ across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). Naming all five 
exogenous variables simply as EXOGENOUS, the second equation in the system to be estimated 
is specified as: 
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itit
n
i
iitit
itititit
EXOGENOUSQBSIZE
INSOWNBLKOWNSACGILEV
εβββ
βββα
++++
+++=
∑
=1
54
3210
                     (3) 
Block Ownership (BLKOWN). Greater managerial monitoring associated with block 
ownership can minimise agency costs and improve firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In 
contrast, block owners can connive with managers to engage in tunnelling at the expense of 
minority owners (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). Hence, the third dependent variable in our system is 
block ownership (BLKOWN). It costs more to buy a proportion of shares in larger firms (Beiner 
et al., 2006), and BLKOWN is expected to relate negatively to firm size (LNTA). Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) suggest that it is more attractive to hold shares in firms with greater growth and 
investment opportunities, and as such we predict that growth (GROWTH) and investment 
(CAPEX) potential will be positively related to BLKOWN. Also, gearing (GEAR) is expected to 
correlate negatively with BLKOWN as firms with BLKOWN are anticipated to use less debt (Bar 
et al., 1995; Ntim, 2009). BLKOWN is also expected to differ across industries (INDUST) and 
over time (YD). Calling all six exogenous variables simply as EXOGENOUS, the third equation 
to be estimated in the system is specified as: 
                
itit
n
i
iitit
itititit
EXOGENOUSQBSIZE
INSOWNLEVSACGIBLKOWN
εβββ
βββα
++++
+++=
∑
=1
54
3210
                   (4) 
Institutional Ownership (INSOWN). Due to their relative financial clout, institutional 
shareholders can impact positively on CG structures and Q (Barr et al., 1995). Hence, the fourth 
dependent variable in our system is institutional ownership (INSOWN). It is more attractive to 
hold shares in larger firms with greater growth and investment potential (Agrawal & Knoeber, 
1996), and as such, we expect growth (GROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm size 
(LNTA) and the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM) to correlate positively with INSOWN. 
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Also, INSOWN is expected to differ across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). Hence, 
referring to all six exogenous variables simply as EXOGENOUS, the fourth equation to be 
estimated in the system is specified as: 
           
itit
n
i
iitit
ititit
EXOGENOUSQBSIZE
BLKOWNLEVSACGIINSOWN
εβββ
βββα
++++
+++=
∑
=1
54
3210
                         (5) 
Board Size (BSIZE). Larger boards are associated with increased monitoring and greater 
opportunities to secure critical business resources that can enhance firm value (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006). By contrast, Guest (2009) suggests that larger boards tend to be associated with greater 
free-riding and lower Q. Therefore, the fifth dependent variable in our system is board size 
(BSIZE). Smaller firms have greater growth prospects (Chen et al., 2010), and as such, we expect 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) and growth (GROWTH) to relate negatively to BSIZE. Also, it is 
expected that firm size (LNTA), crosslisting (CROSLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), gearing (GEAR) 
and the presence of a CG committee (CGCOM) will relate positively to BSIZE. Board size is also 
expected to vary across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). Calling all nine exogenous 
variables simply as EXOGENOUS, the fifth equation to be estimated in the system is specified as:  
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Firm Value (Q). Finally, to examine the link between Q and the five CG mechanisms, 
the dependent variable in the last equation in our system is Q. All the control variables included 
in equation (1) are labelled simply as CONTROLS. Therefore, the final equation to be estimated 
in the system is specified as: 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Empirical Results: Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Regression Analysis 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of all variables included in our regression analysis. It shows 
that Tobin’s Q ranges from a minimum of 0.72 to a maximum of 3.607 with an average of 1.56, 
indicating wide variation in market valuation among the sampled firms. Our alternative firm 
value proxies (TSR and ROA), as well as the SACGI and the Social-SACGI also show wide 
spreads. For example, the SACGI suggests that the scores range from a minimum of 6% (3 out of 
50) to a maximum of 98% (49 out of 50) with the average firm complying with 61% of the 50 
CG provisions analysed, an indication that a high degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to 
the importance SA firms attach to CG.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 also indicates that, on average, compliance with the Social-SACGI is higher than 
with the overall SACGI. For example, the median firm in our sample complied with 78% of the 
Social-SACGI compared with 64% for the SACGI, evidence (as discussed further below) that 
may be explained by political cost, legitimacy and resource independence theories. The 
alternative CG mechanisms (LEV, BSIZE, BLKOWN and INSOWN), as well as the exogenous 
variables, suggest wide spreads. This implies that the CG provisions and the sampled firms have 
been appropriated selected, and thus reduces the possibilities of sample selection bias that have 
arguably plagued much of the prior studies (Durnev & Kim, 2005; Renders et al., 2010).  
 18 
 
 
OLS regression is used to test all our hypotheses, and OLS assumptions of 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity are tested. Table 4 
contains the correlation matrix for all variables included in our analysis to test for 
multicollinearity, and as a robustness check, we report both the Pearson’s parametric and 
Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients. Both the magnitude and direction of the coefficients of 
the parametric and non-parametric correlations appear very similar, suggesting that no serious 
non-normality problems remain.   
Insert Table 4 about here 
 Apart from the expected high significant correlation between the SACGI and its sub-
index, the Social-SACGI, both matrices suggest that correlations among the variables are 
relatively low, indicating that no major multicollinearity problems exist. We further investigated 
(for brevity not reported here, but available upon request) scatter plots for P-P and Q-Q, 
studentised residuals, Cook’s distances and Durbin-Watson statistics. The tests suggested no 
serious violation of the OLS assumptions of homoscedasticity, linearity, normality and 
autocorrelation, respectively. Of interest, and in line with prior studies (Klapper & Love, 2004; 
Morey et al., 2009), the SACGI is significant and positively related to Q, suggesting that better-
governed firms tend to be associated with higher market valuation. Additionally, there are 
significant relationships between the alternative CG mechanisms. For example, block ownership 
correlates negatively with the SACGI, implying that it appears to serve as a substitute for better 
CG practices. In contrast, board size and institutional ownership correlate positively with the 
SACGI, indicating that the three CG mechanisms are complements.  
 
Empirical Results: OLS (Multivariate) Regression Analysis 
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Table 5 reports OLS regression results of Q on the SACGI. Column 3 of Table 5 first presents the 
results of a simple regression of Q on the SACGI only, whilst columns 4 to 9 contain the results 
of a regression of Q on the SACGI and the control variables for the pooled8 sample in addition to 
a regression for each of the 5 firm-years, respectively. As hypothesised, Column 3 of Table 5 
shows that the SACGI is positive (0.003) and statistically significant (p<.001). However, the 
significant coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 5 seems to suggest that there 
may be omitted variables bias. Therefore, the control variables are added to the regressions and 
reported in columns 4 to 9 of Table 5 to control for potential omitted variables bias.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Consistent with our prediction, the coefficient on the SACGI remains statistically 
significant and positive over the entire sample period. This implies that investors reward SA 
listed firms that have better CG standards with higher market valuation. An economic 
implication of our finding is that a positive one standard deviation change in the average firm’s 
SACGI score from 61% to 80%, can be expected to be associated with an increase in its average 
market valuation (Q) by about 6% (19 x 0.003) from 1.56 to 1.65, ceteris paribus. Our results 
generally provide support to those of prior studies (Black et al., 2006; Renders et al., 2010), but 
specifically to those of past cross-country studies whose samples include a small number of SA 
firms (Klapper & Love, 2004; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009).  
The coefficients on the control variables in the lower part of Columns 4 to 9 of Table 5 
generally show the predicted signs. For example, and as hypothesised, audit firm size, 
crosslisting, growth and Qt-1 are positive and significantly associated with Qt, while the 
coefficient on firm size is negative and significantly related to Q over the entire sample period. 
In line with the results of Henry (2008), the coefficients on the year dummies are significant, 
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indicating that Q differs over time, but the insignificant coefficients on the industry dummies, 
except for consumer services firms, do not support the results of Beiner et al. (2006) and Haniffa 
& Hudaib (2006).  
As previously explained, the uniqueness of our SACGI is that it incorporates nine SA 
context-specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions (see section four of the 
Appendix). These issues are of great importance within the SA corporate context, due to the on-
going policy debate as to whether given the voluntary nature of the CG regime, SA firms will 
voluntarily comply with these CG provisions (Maherbe & Segal, 2003). However, there are 
mixed theoretical positions regarding the impact that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions 
will have on firm value. Stakeholder theory (Kakabadse & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002) suggests 
that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions imposes additional financial costs on SA firms. 
In contrast, political cost, legitimacy and resources dependence theories (Andreasson, 2010) 
indicate that compliance with stakeholder CG provisions does not only help in reducing political 
costs, such as the risk of nationalisation, but also offer greater access to resources, such as tax 
holidays and profitable government contracts. To investigate the impact of complying with 
affirmative action and stakeholder provisions on firm value, we run a separate regression of Q on 
the Social-SACGI. We hypothesise a significant association between the Social-SACGI and Q, 
but given the mixed literature, we do not specify the direction of the coefficient. 
Table 6 contains OLS regression results of Q on the Social-SACGI. Column 3 of Table 6 
first reports the results of a simple regression of Q on the Social-SACGI alone, whereas columns 
4 to 9 present the results of a regression of Q on the Social-SACGI and the control variables for 
the full sample in addition to a regression for each of the 5 firm-years, respectively. Column 3 of 
Table 6 shows that the coefficient on the Social-SACGI is positive (0.002) and significant 
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(p<.001). The coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 6 is also, however, 
significant, which implies that there may be omitted variables bias. As a result, to test that 
whether the positive relationship between the Social-SACGI and Q is spuriously caused by some 
omitted variables, the control variables are added to the regressions in columns 4 to 9 of Table 6.   
Insert Table 6 about here 
The coefficient on the Social-SACGI remains significant and positive over the entire 
sample period, but the magnitude of the coefficient fluctuates between 0.001 and 0.008. This 
implies that, on average, firms that comply better with the Social-SACGI tend to be associated 
with higher market valuation. The results also offer empirical support to political cost, legitimacy 
and resource dependence theories. Within the SA context, apart from being part of King II and 
the JSE’s listing rules, some of the stakeholder provisions, such as employment equity and black 
empowerment are backed by statutory legislation. This implies that listed firms, and especially 
large companies, are more likely to voluntarily comply with the Social-SACGI in order to 
minimise potential political costs and legitimise their operations. Indeed, the significant positive 
correlation between the Social-SACGI and firm size in Table 3 supports this hypothesis. 
Crucially, and of particular relevance to basic materials and technology firms, securing and 
renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for instance, are normally linked to 
meeting black empowerment and employment equity targets (Malherbe & Segal, 2003). This 
means that compliance with the Social-SACGI may be a major way by which firms can gain 
access to valuable resources that can facilitate growth and improve long-term market valuation. 
This seems to serve as a major additional motivation for firms to voluntarily comply with the 
Social-SACGI, and hence, appears to explain the positive link between the Social-SACGI and Q. 
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ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
Our regression analysis so far does not take into account the existence of alternative CG 
mechanisms, firm value proxies, CG weighting scheme, other estimation techniques and 
endogeneity. The positive association between the SACGI and firm value, for example, could 
consequently be misleading. In this section, we examine how sensitive our results are to the 
presence of alternative CG mechanisms and endogenous relationships (especially simultaneous 
endogeneity), firm value proxies, CG weighting scheme, and firm-level fixed effects. 
 
Results from a 2SLS Estimation of Equations (2) to (7) 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we use OLS to estimate equation (7), which permits the 
existence of all the alternative CG mechanisms, but does not allow for interdependencies. The 
rationale is to ascertain what happens to the SACGI in the presence of alternative CG structures. 
Of special note, the results (for brevity not reported here, but available upon request) indicate 
that the SACGI remains positive and significant (p<.001) in the presence of other CG structures. 
Also, the coefficients on board size and institutional ownership are both significant (p<.05) and 
positively associated with Q, whereas leverage and block ownership are insignificantly related to 
Q. Noticeably, the positive association between board size and Q supports the results of Beiner et 
al. (2006), but rejects those of Guest (2009). Second, and following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), 
we estimate equation (7) along with equations (2) to (6) as a system of simultaneous equations, 
using 2SLS9. Specifically, in the first stage, we estimate each of equations (2) to (6) specified 
above along with their respective control variables, and the resulting predicted values (i.e., 
predicted part of each CG structure) are saved. In the second stage, we use the predicted parts as 
instruments10 for the CG mechanisms, and equation (7) is estimated along with the control 
variables and their respective instruments using the 2SLS technique. As previously explained, 
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this procedure considers firm value (Q) as endogenous along with the five CG structures, which 
allows each of the CG mechanisms to affect all the others in order to detect complementary or 
substitution effects, but also permits Q to affect the choice of each CG structure.  
 Table 7 contains the results of a 2SLS estimation of equations (2) to (7). Most importantly, 
the coefficient on the SACGI in Column 8 of Table 7 remains positive and significant (p<.01), 
implying that our finding of a positive relationship between the SACGI and Q is robust to 
endogeneity and/or the introduction of alternative CG mechanisms into the analysis. It also 
provides further empirical support to the results of prior studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Morey et al., 
2009) that better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher market valuation. Our 2SLS 
results reported in Column 8 of Table 7 further indicate that the coefficients on board size and 
institutional ownership remain significant and positive, whereas those of leverage and block 
ownership are still insignificant. The positive association between Q and board size again 
supports the results of Beiner et al. (2006), but contradicts those of Guest (2009). 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Additionally, the results in Table 7 reveal significant interdependencies among the five 
CG structures and Q. First, our results presented in Column 3 show that the coefficient on Q is 
positive and significant (p<.001), implying that higher SACGI scores is not only associated with 
higher firm valuation, but that there is a reverse association (i.e., SA firms with higher Q values 
also appear to adopt better CG practices). Consistent with our hypothesis, the findings contained 
in Column 3 suggest that larger board size, higher institutional ownership and greater leverage 
usage are significantly associated with higher SACGI scores, but higher block ownership is 
significantly related to lower SACGI values. This suggests substitutability between the SACGI 
and block ownership, an indication that firms with poor CG structures can compensate that with 
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a dominant block shareholder. It also supports the view that firms optimally choose CG 
structures, whereby a greater use of one CG mechanism may lead to a lesser use of others, 
resulting in equally good performance.   
Second, our results reported in Column 4 of Table 7 indicate that block ownership is 
positively and significantly related to leverage, rejecting our hypothesis that SA firms with 
significant block ownership are likely to use less debt. The insignificant link between Q and 
leverage also does not support capital structure and Jensen’s (1986) ‘free cash flow’ theories that 
greater leverage is associated with higher market valuation. Third, our results contained in 
Column 5 of Table 7 indicate that there is a significant reverse association between block 
ownership and the SACGI, supporting our hypothesis that the two are substitutes. Institutional 
ownership, leverage and board size have a significant and positive relationship with block 
ownership, but firms with higher block ownership do not necessarily receive lower market 
valuation. Fourth, consistent with our predictions, the results reported in Column 6 reveal that 
there is a significant complementary relationship between institutional ownership and the SACGI, 
and also between institutional and block ownerships. The results imply that due to greater 
financial strength, firms with greater institutional ownership tend to have better CG standards. 
Finally, the results presented in Column 7 of Table 7 show that firms with higher SACGI scores 
and institutional ownership tend to be significantly associated with larger boards, revealing that 
the three CG mechanisms are complements.  
 
Alternative Firm Value Proxies, CG Weights and Firm-Level Fixed Effects 
In this final subsection, we conduct three further sets of sensitivity analyses, specifically relating 
to alternative firm value proxies, CG weights and estimation techniques. First, we investigate 
 25 
 
 
how sensitive our results are to two alternative firm value proxies: total share returns (TSR – a 
market based measure) and return on assets (ROA – an accounting based proxy). As previously 
noted, these firm value measures have been used widely within the CG literature (Gompers et al., 
2003; Renders et al., 2010). As with Q, better-governed firms are expected to be associated with 
higher ROA and TSR. Table 8 reports regression results based on the alternative firm value 
proxies, CG weights and estimation technique. Columns 3 and 4 contain OLS regression results 
of TSR on the SACGI without and with the control variables, respectively, while Columns 5 and 
6 report similarly for the ROA. Our results show that the coefficients on the SACGI in Columns 3 
to 6 remain positive and significant, at least at the 5% level. This indicates that our results are 
robust when a market (TSR) or an accounting (ROA) based measure of firm value is used instead 
of Tobin’s Q. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
 Second, and similar to Beiner et al. (2006), we examine whether our results depend on 
the weighting of the five sections of our SACGI. As previously noted, all 50 provisions forming 
the SACGI are equally weighted, but the number of provisions varies across the five sections. 
Thus, this simple equal weighting scheme results in different weights being assigned to each of 
the five sections: board, directors, and ownership (54%); accounting and auditing (12%), risk 
management, internal audit and control (10%); integrated sustainability reporting (18%); and 
compliance and enforcement (6%). To ascertain whether our results are sensitive to the 
weighting of the five sections, we construct an alternative SACGI, defined as Weighted-SACGI, 
in which each of the five sections is awarded equal weight of 20%. Our results reported in 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 8 indicate that the coefficients of the Weighted-SACGI in the analysis 
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of the cross-sectional variation in Q are positive and significant (p<.10), suggesting that our 
results are robust to this alternative weighting scheme. 
 Finally, as firms tend to differ in the opportunities and challenges that they encounter 
over time, this can result in a situation where CG and firm value are jointly and dynamically 
determined by unobserved firm-specific variables (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), which simple 
OLS regressions may be unable to detect. Thus, given the panel nature of our data and in line 
with Henry (2008) and Guest (2009), we estimate a fixed effects model to account for possible 
unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. This involves re-estimating equation (1), with the inclusion 
of 168 dummies to represent the 169 sampled firms. Our fixed effects results contained in 
Column 9 of Table 8 show that the coefficient on the SACGI remains positive and significant 
(p<.10), an indication that our results are robust to potential unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. 
Overall, the results from our robustness tests make us reasonably confident that our main 
evidence of a positive link between CG and firm value in SA is not falsely driven by any form of 
endogeneity. 
   
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The paper investigates the relationship between a broad corporate governance (CG) index and 
firm value using a sample of 169 post-Apartheid South African (SA) listed firms from 2002 to 
2007 and 50 CG provisions based on the 2002 King Report (King II). SA is a particularly 
interesting country to analyse. Historically, it has a predominantly Anglo-American CG model, 
with firms expected to primarily promote the interests of shareholders. However, post-Apartheid 
CG reforms have attempted to distinctively superimpose substantial affirmative action and 
stakeholder demands aimed at addressing historical socio-economic inequalities between white 
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and non-white South Africans, such as black empowerment and HIV/Aids CG provisions on 
listed firms to explicitly comply with. This makes the South African CG model unique and a 
hybrid of the traditional ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models of CG. The SA corporate 
context is further characterised by deep equity culture, concentrated ownership, high levels of 
institutional ownership and weak enforcement of corporate regulations, but conspicuously a 
dearth of empirical evidence.  
First, our main conclusion is that we find a significant and positive association between 
good CG practices (SACGI) and Tobin’s Q (Q), implying that better-governed SA firms tend to 
be associated with higher market valuation. Distinct from most prior studies, our evidence is 
robust to different forms of endogeneity, as well as different types of accounting and market-
based firm value proxies. Second, the distinctive features of the South African CG framework 
allows us to uniquely analyse the relationship between complying with affirmative action and 
stakeholder CG provisions (Social-SACGI) and the market value of SA listed firms. Our results 
show that SA firms that comply better with the stakeholder CG provisions tend to be associated 
with higher market valuation. The results provide empirical support to political cost, legitimacy 
and resource dependence theories. Within the SA corporate context, compliance with stakeholder 
CG provisions appears to be a major way by which listed firms can reduce political costs, such as 
the risk of nationalisation, and also gain access to resources, such as profitable government 
contracts to facilitate growth and improve long-term firm value.  
Third, different from most past studies, our results place emphasis on the need to account 
for possible interdependencies among alternative CG mechanisms (board size, leverage, block, 
and institutional ownerships) and Q using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The rationale is to 
ascertain whether our broad CG index (SACGI) is simultaneously and dynamically determined 
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by firm value (Q), as well as the other four CG mechanisms. Most importantly, the 2SLS results 
show that our SACGI remains positively and significantly related to Q in the presence of the 
other four CG mechanisms. However, the 2SLS results also suggest that there is a reverse 
association between our broad CG index and Q (i.e., higher SACGI scores may not only be 
associated with higher Q, but also SA firms with higher Q appear to adopt better CG practices). 
We also find evidence of significant interdependencies among the five CG mechanisms, 
including a negative relationship between block ownership and the SACGI, implying that SA 
firms with poor CG structures can compensate for that with a dominant block shareholder 
without necessarily receiving lower market valuation. This re-enforces the need for future 
research to fully take into account possible alternative CG mechanisms in order to produce 
robust evidence. 
Fourth, our results have important policy and regulatory implications. The prior literature 
suggests that a good CG framework is crucial to corporate success, and our results suggest that 
the market rewards firms with better CG practices with higher market valuation. As an emerging 
market, good CG practices are particularly important as this may not only help reduce corporate 
failures, but also assist companies to attract foreign direct investments, which may facilitate 
faster economic growth and development in SA. In this respect, efforts by the SA Institute of 
Directors, the Department of Trade and Industry, the King Committee, and the JSE at improving 
CG standards in SA companies is laudable. The significant positive link between the Social-
SACGI and firm value implies that SA listed firms may need to pay serious attention to 
complying with the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions and also in preparing the 
integrated sustainability report.  
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Finally, whilst our findings are important and robust, some caveats are in order. We use a 
binary coding scheme which treats every CG mechanism as equally important. Whilst results 
based on our equally weighted SACGI and the alternatively weighted index are essentially 
similar, future studies may enrich their analysis by constructing weighted and un-weighted CG 
indices. Also, due to data limitations, we use only four alternative CG structures in our 2SLS 
analysis. As more data becomes available, future studies may need to introduce more 
mechanisms, such as data on the market for corporate control, in their analysis.      
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1. The largest nine SA firms are: Anglo American, De Beers, Dimension Data, First Rand, M-Cell, NEDCOR, 
Old Mutual, South African Brewery, and Standard Bank Investment (CLSA, 2000: 63). Apart from being 
extremely large as the average firm size of the CLSA sample is $9.4bn (CLSA 2000: 9) compared to 
R6.2bn or $821m in our sample, four of the nine firms: Old Mutual, First Rand, NEDCOR, and Standard 
Bank Investment are financials (CLSA, 2000: 13). As noted below, due to regulatory and capital structure 
reasons, financial and utility firms are excluded from our sample. 
2. For regulatory and capital structure reasons, as well as following prior studies (Henry, 2008; Chen et al., 
2010), the financial and utilities industries, with a total 111 listed firms, were excluded, leaving us with 
eight industries and 291 listed firms to be sampled. 
3. It takes time for the effects of governance mechanisms to reflect in firm value (Render et al., 2010). Hence, 
to avoid endogenous association between firm value and CG, we introduce a one year lag between CG and 
firm value such that a firm’s value in any year (Qt) depends on the previous year’s governance structure 
(CGt-1), similar to Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Renders et al. (2010). The sample begins from 2002 
because data coverage in the Perfect Information Database/DataStream on SA listed firms is very limited 
until 2002 and also because King II came into operation in 2002.   
4. As Panel B of Table 1 shows, for the 122 remaining firms, two or more years’ financial data and annual 
reports were not available in the DataStream/Perfect Information Database. For the other 28 companies, 
both financial data and annual reports were not available. 
5. For robust results, alternative accounting (return on assets - ROA) and market (total share returns - TSR) 
based measures of firm value for which data is available is introduced in Section five. These proxies 
measure the efficiency and effectiveness with which a firm uses its assets to generate accounting profits 
(ROA), as well as maximise market value (TSR). As with Q, firms with effective CG structures are 
expected to be related to higher ROA and TSR. Previous studies indicate that insiders (managers) and 
outsiders (investors) value CG differently (Black et al., 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). As such, the 
accounting (ROA) and market (TSR) alternative firm value proxies attempt to measure the wealth effects of 
CG structures from the perspectives of insiders (managers) and outsiders (investors), respectively. As with 
Q, they have been used widely, and so their empirical validity is grounded in a rigorously established 
empirical literature (Klapper & Love, 2004; Guest, 2009). 
6. For lack of sufficient number of observations in three industries, namely health care, oil & gas, and 
telecommunications industries with three, one and three listed firms, respectively, observations from these 
industries were merged with the closest remaining five major industries. As a result (see Panel B of Table 
1), the three health care firms were added to the consumer services industry, the one oil & gas firm was 
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included in the basic materials industry, while the three telecommunications companies were included in 
the technology firms. 
7. To minimise the effects of outliers, and following Renders et al. (2010), we winsorise all the variables at 
the conventional 1% and 99% levels. However, the whole regression analysis was first run with the outliers 
included, and the results were essentially the same. The main rationale for winsorising is to minimise 
potential serious violations of the OLS assumptions. 
8. To ensure that the residuals of a given firm may not be correlated across different years (time-series 
dependence) or firms (cross-sectional dependence) within our five-year panel (Gujarati, 2003), and 
following Pertersen (2009), we apply the empirically robust Clustered Standard Errors technique to 
estimate the coefficients. Further, we estimate separate regressions for each of the five firm-years, in 
addition to estimating a firm-level fixed effects model to minimise potential residual dependence. 
9. To ensure that the 2SLS technique is appropriate, and following Beiner et al. (2006), we first carried out the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (see Beiner et al., 2006: 267 for a detailed description of the procedure) to test 
for the endogeneity of the CG mechanisms and Q. Applied to equation 7, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
exogeneity test rejects the null hypothesis of no endogeneity at the 5% level. Thus, we conclude that 2SLS 
technique is appropriate and that our OLS results may be misleading (i.e., biased and inconsistent). 
10. The order-condition for identifying a system suggests that the number of exogenous variables excluded 
from any equation must be greater than or equal to the number of endogenous variables included minus one 
(Gujarati, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006). Our system of equations consists of nine exogenous and six 
endogenous variables. Hence, at least three of our exogenous variables must be excluded from any single 
equation to identify the system. However, following prior research (Beiner et al., 2006; Larcker & Rusticus, 
2010), equations (2) to (7) are separately developed based on theory, logic and data availability without 
excessive regard to meeting the order-condition. As over-identification cannot jeopardise our system 
(Gujarati, 2003; Beiner et al., 2006), all our six equations are over-identified. Also, we carried out a Sargan 
test for instrument exogeneity, but could not be rejected (at least at the 10% level) for all six equations. We 
are, therefore, reasonably certain that our instruments are exogenous and our system is not misspecified. 
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APPENDIX 
  
Full List of the South African Corporate Governance Index Provisions Based on King II 
 
SECTION 1: BOARD, DIRECTORS AND OWNERSHIP 
 
1. Whether the roles of chairperson and CEO/MD are split. 
2. Whether the chairperson of the board is an independent non-executive director. 
3. Whether the board is composed by a majority of non-executive directors (NEDs). 
4. Whether the board meets at least four times in a year. 
5. Whether individual directors’ meetings record is disclosed. 
6. Whether directors are clearly classified into executive, NED, and independent. 
7. Whether chairperson’s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed. 
8. Whether CEO/MD’s performance and effectiveness is appraised and disclosed. 
9. Whether the board’s performance and effectiveness is evaluated and disclosed.  
10. Whether the board subcommittees’ performance and effectiveness is evaluated. 
11. Whether directors’ biography, experience and responsibilities are disclosed. 
12. Whether a policy that prohibits directors, officers and employees (insider) share dealings 
around the release of price sensitive information is disclosed. 
13. The existence of the office of company secretary. 
14. Whether a nomination committee has been established. 
15. Whether the nomination committee consists of a majority independent NEDs. 
16. Whether the chairperson of the nomination committee is an independent NED. 
17. Whether the membership of the nomination committee is disclosed. 
18. Whether the nomination committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
19. Whether a remuneration committee has been established. 
20. Whether the remuneration committee is constituted entirely by independent NEDs. 
21. Whether the chairperson of the remuneration committee is an independent NED. 
22. Whether the membership of the remuneration committee is disclosed. 
23. Whether the remuneration committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is 
disclosed. 
24. Whether directors’ remuneration, interests, and share options are disclosed. 
25. Whether director remuneration philosophy and procedure is disclosed. 
26. Whether directors’ have access to free independent professional legal advice. 
27.  Whether share ownership by all insiders, including directors, officers, employees and 
employees’ trust is less than 50% of the total company shareholdings. 
 
SECTION 2: ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING 
 
28. Whether an audit committee has been established. 
29. Whether the audit committee is constituted by at least 2 independent NEDs with 
significant professional financial training and experience. 
30. Whether the chairperson of the audit committee is an independent NED. 
31. Whether the membership of the audit committee is disclosed. 
32. Whether the audit committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
33. Whether a board statement on the going-concern status of the firm is disclosed. 
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SECTION 3: RISK MANAGEMENT, INTERNAL AUDIT AND CONTROL 
 
34. Whether a risk management committee has been established. 
35. Whether the risk committee’s members’ meetings attendance record is disclosed. 
36. Whether a narrative on both actual and potential future systematic and non-systematic 
risks is disclosed. 
37. Whether a narrative on existing internal control systems (including internal audit) is 
disclosed. 
38. Whether a narrative on how current and future assessed company risks will be managed 
is disclosed. 
 
SECTION 4: INTEGRATED SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING (NON-FINANCIALS) 
 
39. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing the 
broad-based black economic empowerment and empowerment of women laws, including 
black equity ownership, preferential procurement, enterprise development, and executive 
management control is disclosed. 
40. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing 
employment equity laws in terms of gender, age, ethnicity and disabilities is disclosed. 
41. Whether a narrative on how a firm is addressing the threat posed by HIV/Aids pandemic 
in South Africa is disclosed. 
42. Whether a narrative on the actual measures taken by a firm to address occupational health 
and safety of its employees is disclosed. 
43. Whether a narrative on how a firm is actually complying with and implementing rules 
and regulations on the environment is disclosed.  
44. Whether a narrative on the existence of a code of ethics is disclosed. 
45. Whether a firm’s board is formed by at least 1 white and 1 non-white (board diversity on 
the basis of ethnicity) person. 
46. Whether a firm’s board is formed by at least 1 male and 1 female (board diversity on the 
basis of gender) person. 
47. Whether a narrative on the actual community support and other corporate social 
investments or responsibilities is disclosed. 
 
SECTION 5: ENCOURAGING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 
 
48. Whether a positive statement on the compliance or non-compliance with the corporate 
governance provisions of King II is disclosed. 
49. Whether a narrative on how a firm is contributing towards the development of financial 
journalism is disclosed. 
50. Whether a narrative on what a firm is doing to encourage shareholder activism, like 
having investor relations department and proxy voting is disclosed. 
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TABLE 1 
Summary of the Sample Selection Procedure 
Panel A: Industrial composition of firms listed on the  No. in each      Percentage 
 JSE available to be sampled as at 31/12/2007 industry        of sample  
Industrials              81   27.8 
Basic materials             67   23.0 
Consumer services             62   21.3  
Consumer goods             36   12.4  
Technology              31   10.7  
Health care                7     2.4        
Telecommunications               4     1.4  
Oil and gas                3     1.0 
Total firms available to be sampled         291                  100.0 
       Less:  Firms with no year’s data available        28     
                 Firms with some years’ data missing      94      122   41.9  
Total sampled firms with full data         169   58.1 
Panel B: Industrial composition of    No. in each      Percentage  
   sampled firms with full data   industry      of sample  
Industrials               51   30.2 
Consumer services             35   20.7 
Basic materials              33   19.5  
Consumer Goods             24   14.2  
Technology              19   11.2  
Health care                3     1.8        
Telecommunications                3     1.8  
Oil and gas                1     0.6 
Total sampled firms with full data         169                       100.0 
Source: The JSE Ltd.  
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TABLE 2 
Summary of Variables 
Firm Value/CG (Endogenous) Variables 
Q  Ratio of total assets (wc02999) minus book value of equity (wc03501 +wc03451)  
plus market value (mv) of equity to total assets (wc02999).  
ROA (%) Ratio of operating profit (wc01250) to total assets (wc02999). 
TSR (%) Total share returns made up of share price and dividends. 
SACGI Corporate governance (CG) index containing 50 provisions from King II that  
takes a value of 1 if each of the 50 CG provisions is disclosed, 0 otherwise; scaled  
to a value between 0% and 100%. 
S-SACGI Defined as Social-SACGI. It is a sub-index of the SACGI containing 9 SA context  
specific affirmative action and stakeholder CG provisions that form the SACGI. 
BSIZE  Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
BLKOWN Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company  
shareholdings. 
INSOWN  Percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders. 
LEV (%) Ratio of total debt (wc03255) to total assets (wc02999). 
Control (Exogenous) Variables 
CGCOM 1, if a firm has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise 
BIG4  1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte  
& Touche, Ernst & Young, and KPMG), 0 otherwise.  
CAPEX (%) Ratio of total capital expenditure (wc04601) to total assets (wc02999). 
CROSLIST 1, if a firm is crosslisted to a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
GEAR (%) Ratio of total debt (wc03255) to market value (mv) of equity.  
GROWT (%) Current year’s sales (wc01001) minus last year’s sales to last year’s sales. 
INDUSTRY Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic material + oil gas;  
consumer goods, consumer services + health care; industrials; and technology +  
telecommunications firms. 
LNTA  Natural log of total assets (wc02999). 
YEAR  Dummies for each of the five years from 2003 to 2007 inclusive. 
Notes: The codes in parentheses refer to DataStream codes for the respective accounting and market variables used 
in the analysis. 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics of all Variables for all (845) Firm Years 
Variable            Mean             Median         Std. Dev.       Maximum     Minimum 
Tobin’s Q             1.56    1.34  0.67             3.60            0.72  
Return on assets            0.11    0.12  0.14  0.38           -0.19  
Total share returns            0.28    0.25             0.89             2.36           -0.48 
SACGI              0.61    0.64  0.19  0.98            0.06 
Social-SACGI             0.69    0.78  0.27  1.00            0.00 
Board size             9.75  10.00             3.67           18.00            4.00 
Block ownership            0.62    0.65             0.18  0.92            0.10 
Institutional ownership          0.74    0.82  0.23  0.98            0.09  
Leverage             0.18    0.16  0.14  0.56            0.05 
Growth             0.12    0.14  0.26            0.89           -0.44 
Capital expenditure            0.13    0.08  0.15  0.66            0.07 
Gearing             0.32    0.19             0.31             0.78            0.01 
Firm size             5.86    6.02  0.48  7.83            4.24 
CG committee             0.32    0.00  0.47  1.00            0.00 
Audit firm size            0.73    1.00  0.44  1.00            0.00 
Crosslisting             0.22    0.00  0.41  1.00            0.00 
Notes: Table 2 above provides the full definitions of all the variables used. 
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